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A European Perspective on Data Processing Consent through the
Re-conceptualization of European Data Protection’s Looking Glass
after the Lisbon Treaty: Taking Rights Seriously
FEDERICO FERRETTI*
Abstract: EU data protection law is undergoing a process of reform to meet the
challenges of the modern economy and rapid technological developments. This study
re-conceptualizes data protection in the EU in light of the enactment of the Treaty of
Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. It focuses on data subjects’
consent as a key component of data processing legislation – alongside the principles of
purpose specification and data quality – to reinforce the view that it is a necessary,
though not sufficient, tool to guarantee the declared high level of protection of
individuals. To prevent confusion, conflation, or abuse of consent and safeguard the
fundamental values to which it is tied, this paper puts forward that additional legal
constraints and qualifications would be necessary for the enhancement of its application
and enforcement. Soft or libertarian paternalism may be the key to nudge individuals
towards the desired social outcome while preserving their individual autonomy. The
ultimate suggestion is that EU policy makers should take rights seriously and not be
seduced by and surrender to conflicting economic interests.
Résumé: La loi européenne sur la protection des données est en train de subir un
ensemble de réformes afin de pouvoir faire face aux défis de l´économie moderne et des
développements technologiques rapides. La présente étude re-conceptualise la protection
des données dans l´UE à la lumière de l´adoption du Traité de Lisbonne et de la Charte
des Droits Fondamentaux de l´UE. Elle se concentre sur le principe du consentement
comme étant un composant-clé de la législation sur le traitement des données pour
renforcer l´idée qu´il est un instrument nécessaire, bien qu´insuffisant, pour garantir le
niveau dit élévé de protection des individus. Afin de prévenir la confusion, l’amalgame
ou l’abus de consentementet de sauvegarder les valeurs fondamentales auxquelles il est
lié, le présent article indique que des contraintes et des qualifications législatives
supplémentaires seraient nécessaires pour l’amélioration de son application et de son
exécution. Un paternalisme souple ou libertaire pourrait être la solutionpour amener des
individus vers le résultat social désiré tout en préservant leur autonomie individuelle. La
dernière suggestion est de convaincre les décideurs de l´UE de prendre les droits au
sérieux et dene pas se laisser séduire, ou soumettre, par des intérêts économiques
incompatibles.
Zusammenfassung: Das EU-Datenschutzrecht befindet sich in einem
Reformationsprozess, um den Herausforderungen der modernen Wirtschaft und den
schnellen technologischen Entwicklungen zu begegnen. Der vorliegende Beitrag
konzeptioniert den Datenschutz in der EU im Licht des Inkrafttretens des Lissabonner
* Lecture in Law, Brunel Law School, Brunel University London. E-mail: fed.ferretti@libero.it or
Federico.Ferretti@brunel.ac.uk.
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Vertrages und der EU-Grundrechtecharta neu. Er konzentriert sich auf die Einwilligung
des Betroffenen als Schlüsselkomponente der Datenschutzbestimmungen – neben den
Grundsätzen der Zweckbindung und Datenqualität – und stützt die Ansicht, dass diese
ein notwendiges, wenn auch nicht ausreichendes, Werkzeug ist, um das erklärte hohe
Niveau von Individualschutz zu garantieren. Der Beitrag führt aus, dass - um
Verwirrung, Verwässerung oder Missbrauch bezüglich der Einwilligung zu verhindern
und die zu Grunde liegenden grundlegenden Wertungen zu bewahren - zusätzliche
gesetzliche Beschränkungen und Bedingungen für die Verbesserung ihrer Anwendung
und Durchsetzung notwendig wären. Ein „weicher“ bzw. „libertarian“ Paternalismus
könnte der Schlüssel dazu sein, Individuen in Richtung des gewünschten sozialen
Ergebnisses zu lenken und gleichzeitig ihre individuelle Autonomie zu wahren.
Schließlich wird angemahnt, dass EU-Politiker diese Rechte ernst nehmen und nicht
durch entgegenstehende wirtschaftliche Interessen verführt werden oder diesen erliegen
sollten.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with data protection legislation in the EU and, in
particular, with the meaning and application of the principle of ‘data processing
consent’ in the commercial and consumer protection domain, which may also be
used as a possible example for its general application across all areas covered by
the law.
Data protection is once again high on the EU agenda. To meet the challenges
of rapid technological developments and the modern economy, the EU Commission
has launched consultations in view to reform the current legal framework for data
protection of Directive 95/46/EC and propose a new comprehensive legislation in
2012. The declared policy objective is to achieve consistent and effective legal
implementation and application of the fundamental right to protection of personal
data in all areas of the Union’s activities while continuing to guarantee a high level
of protection of individuals.1
Data protection has gained significant momentum with the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty. Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) upgrades the provision on data protection to a ‘provision of general
application’ under Title II alongside other fundamental principles of the EU. It also
imposes on the EU legislator to establish a certain and unequivocal
omni-comprehensive legal framework for data protection. Equally, the Charter of
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A comprehensive
approach on personal data protection in the European Union, 4 Nov. 2010, COM (210) 609 final.
See also the public consultation at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_
consulting_0003_en.htm> followed by a more targeted consultation to the Art. 29 Data Protection
Working Party, which provided the opinion WP 168, infra at p. 4.
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Fundamental Rights of the EU has become binding, which in its Article 8 recognizes
the protection of personal data as an autonomous right distinguished from privacy.2
Since Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU explicitly
indicates consent of data subjects as the main basis for a fair data processing for
specified purposes, it is envisaged that any new data protection legal framework will
not depart from the principle of data subjects’ consent as its linchpin, alongside the
principles of purpose specification and data quality.
However, as appropriately pointed out elsewhere, if the current European
data protection law is flawed, it is reasonable to suggest that the core of the problem
lies in the notion and use of consent.3 Without a doubt, consent is a key element
embedded in the current legislation, which has been repeatedly identified as one
that needs clarification as to its application and that so far has troubled lawyers as
to its meaning and application.4
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to reinforce the view that
consent of data subjects should indeed remain a key component of data protection
legislation as long as its meaning is fully appreciated and, as suggested by EU data
protection authorities, it benefits from an improved application and enforcement.
However, it will be argued that consent may be easily confused, conflated, or
abused. Taken alone, it would be insufficient to guarantee the desired high level of
protection of individuals under the current technological developments and the
complex business models and practices of the modern economy.
Data protection is a key element in the commercial and consumer domain,
whose policies depend significantly on the lawful processing of personal data. Of
course, individuals may be concerned as profiled, monitored, or sorted consumers.
First and foremost, however, data subjects are the beneficiaries of data protection
rights as citizens concerned about their fundamental freedoms in the social and
political sphere. Thus, the ultimate focus of this paper is to defend data processing
2 But see Protocol 30 of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the exemption obtained by the United
Kingdom and Poland, according to which the Charter on Fundamental Rights will not be justiciable
in their national courts or alter their national law.
3 R. BROWNSWORD, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and
Confidentiality’, in S. Gutwirth et al. (eds), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, Heidelberg
2009, pp. 83–110.
4 See European Commission, supra n. 1; Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, The Future of
Privacy, Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal
framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data, WP 168 02356/09/EN,
adopted on 1 Dec. 2009; European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data
Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – ‘A
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union’, Opinion of 14 Jan.
2011. See also Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission – First
report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), Brussels 15 May 2003,
COM (2003) 265 final.
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consent in the area of consumer protection, as long as it is qualified or
supplemented in its application by further normative measures that not only view
data protection as grounded in the classical liberal conception of autonomy and
individualism but also consider it as a collective good with profound social
implications. Such legal constraints, of course, would entail an inherent degree of
paternalism to nudge individuals towards the desirable social outcome and away
from harm greater than benefits deriving from economic interests.
To reach its goals, this paper is organized in three substantive parts, divided
into seven sections.
The first part of the study addresses the concept of privacy and
re-conceptualizes data protection in light of the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, the sharp
distinction between data protection and privacy may become important to devise
effective policies.5 Also, it serves the purpose of identifying the ethical or moral
values on which data protection is grounded in order to interpret, defend, and
reinforce the principles upon which it is based for the changing context posed by the
proposed amendments of the existing law.
Data processing consent is explored in the second part of the paper. In
particular, it analyses the meaning of true consent to inform its application and
enforcement. It aims to shed some light over the illegitimacy or conceptual confusion
of current practices that appear to reveal how consent may be easily abused,
confused, or conflated to reduce it to a nominal concept that fails to protect
individuals adequately. In fact, not only consent may be implied or data processed
on the basis of opt-out practices, but it may also be traded for perceived immediate
economic advantages, or it may be taken contractually or as part of the general
terms and conditions of a contract. Thus, the final part of the paper address the
need to take rights seriously, and it proposes to find corrective normative measures
for a meaningful consent to inform European policy makers in view of the
announced reform of the data processing regime post Treaty of Lisbon.
PART I
2. Data Protection and the Concept of Privacy
Data protection is a complex and multifaceted concept both from a social and a legal
point of view. Although data protection has often been identified with the notion of
privacy, at least under EU law the two are distinct, yet complementary,
fundamental rights. Indeed, as it will be seen, the two derive their normative force
from values that, although at times coincidental and interacting in a variety of ways,
may be conceptualized independently.
5 See S. GUTWIRTH et al., ‘Preface’, in S. Gutwirth et al. (eds), Reinventing Data Protection?,
Springer, Heidelberg 2009, pp. i–xvi.
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Traditionally, the concept of privacy has been seen as always in transition.6
Nonetheless, the recognition of the idea of privacy is deeply rooted in history.7
However, it was only in the nineteenth century that the concept of privacy was
developed as an independent legal value, when Brandeis and Warren identified such
a right as a tort action, defining it as ‘the right to be left alone’.8
Since that publication, it has been largely accepted that in its most general
accession, privacy protection is seen as a legal way of drawing a line at how far
society or other individual subjects may intrude into a person’s own affairs. It
entails that such a person should be left able to conduct his/her personal legitimate
affairs relatively free from unwanted intrusions. As such, privacy is unquestionably
considered to be an expression of freedom and dignity of the individual.
There is a considerable body of literature that contributes to the moral,
social, political and jurisprudential debates on the concept of privacy. The
literature also helps to distinguish between descriptive and normative accounts of
privacy. In these discussions, some emphasize the moral value of and interest in
privacy, while others focus on it as a legal right to be protected. Some studies have
concentrated on privacy as a fundamental value.9 Others have focused on privacy
as human dignity and the development of human personality.10 Other narrower
views of privacy see it as self-determination, intimacy, or a meaningful aspect of
interpersonal relationships, personal expression, and choice.11 Such an
individualistic approach to privacy has been criticized by scholarship arguing that
6 R. JAY & A. HAMILTON, Data Protection – Law and Practice, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell,
London 2003; D.A. MACDONALD, ‘Myths in the Privacy Debate’, in CEI Staff (ed.), The Future
of Financial Privacy, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC 2000, pp. 54–75.
7 Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights
2002 – An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments, Washington, DC, and London
2002.
8 S. WARREN & L. BRANDEIS, ‘The Right to Privacy’, 4.Harvard Law Review 1890, pp. 193–220.
9 See J. PENNOCK & J. CHAPMAN (eds), Privacy, NOMOS XIII, Atherton Press, New York 1971;
J. PAUL et al. (eds), The Right of Privacy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000; J.
RACHELS, ‘Why Privacy Is Important’, 4.Philosophy and Public Affairs 1975, pp. 323–333.
10 See, for example, E.J. BLOUSTEIN, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser’, 39.New York University Law Review 1964, pp. 962–1007: S. STROMHOLM, Right of
Privacy and Rights of the Personality, Norstedt, Stockholm 1967.
11 See, for example, W. PARENT, ‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’, 12.Philosophy and Public Affairs
1983, pp. 269–288. R. GERSTEIN, ‘Intimacy and Privacy’, 89.Ethics 1978, pp. 76–81; A.
WESTIN, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum, New York 1967); J. INNESS, Privacy, Intimacy, and
Isolation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992; C. FRIED, An Anatomy of Values, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge 1970; R. GAVISON, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’, 89.Yale Law
Journal 1980, pp. 421–471; A. MOORE, ‘Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information
Control’, 35.American Philosophical Quarterly 1998, pp. 365–378; F. SCHOEMAN (ed.),
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984;
J. DECEW, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca 1997.
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greater recognition should be given to the broader social importance of privacy:
other than a common value in which individuals enjoy some degree of it, privacy is
seen as a public and collective value vis-à-vis technological developments and
market forces, requiring minimal levels of privacy for all.12 There exist also a
number of works critical of privacy. The so-called ‘reductionist approach’, for
example, takes the view that the right to privacy is derivative, meaning that it can
be explained in the context of other rights without deserving any separate attention.
As such, it can be protected through other rights without any explicit protection on
its own. Any privacy violation would be better understood as the violation of other
more basic rights: ultimately, the right to privacy would merely be a cluster of
rights, where these rights are always overlapped by property rights or rights over
the person such as bodily security.13 Another well-known contribution to the
‘reductionist approach’ is that of Posner who took an economic, cost-benefit
analysis of privacy. He argued that the types of interests protected under privacy
are not distinctive. Most of all, nevertheless, the central proposition is that privacy
protection is economically inefficient. Protection of individual privacy would be
difficult to defend because it does not maximize wealth. On this line of argument,
Posner defends organizational or corporate privacy as more valuable than personal
privacy, the reason being that the former is likely to improve economic efficiency.14
Finally, the concept of privacy has attracted also the criticism of feminists who
caution that it could be easily used as a shield to cover domination, degradation and
abuse of women and other weaker segments of society. In summary, privacy is seen
as a dangerous tool to conceal domestic violence and repression of women.15
At legislative level, the atrocities of Nazism, fascism, and communism pushed
Western nations into attaching great importance to the right to privacy, as it had
been demonstrated how easily it could be violated and the extreme consequences of
such violations. Privacy was soon elevated as a human right, and its standard at
international level was enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
12 P. REGAN, Legislating Privacy, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1995.
13 J. THOMSON, ‘The Right to Privacy’, 4.Philosophy and Public Affairs 1975, pp. 295–314. For
another strong critic of privacy, see also R. BORK, The Tempting of America: The Political
Seduction of the Law, Simon & Schuster, New York 1990. These ‘reductionist approaches’ have
been criticized by a number of commentators: see T. SCANLON, ‘Thomson on Privacy’,
4.Philosophy and Public Affairs, 323–333; Inness, supra at 11; J. JOHNSON, ‘Constitutional
Privacy’, 13.Law and Philosophy, pp. 161–193.
14 R. POSNER, The Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1981.
15 C. MACKINNON, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
1989. There is not a single version of the feminist critique of privacy. Others, while recognizing that
privacy can be a shield for abuse, maintain that privacy should not be completely rejected, e.g., in
cases of state imposed sterilization programmes or other abuses. The challenge, in the end, would
be that of finding a right balance. See A. ALLEN, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free
Society, Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey 1988.
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Rights and later, at European level, incorporated in the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (ECHR).16
The considerable body of literature on the concept of privacy and the
mentioned legislative initiatives all exemplify the difficulty in defining with precision
what remains a broad and at times ambiguous term, but it also helps to set the basis
for distinguishing between ‘privacy’ and ‘data protection’.
3. The (Re-)conceptualization of European Data Protection
Personal data protection is a distinctive European innovation in law that, over the
years, has been gaining acceptance outside the EU. It emerged in the 1970s as a
complementary need of the aforementioned ECHR to meet the challenges of
emerging technologies. The protection of individuals’ personal data also became
enshrined in the constitutions and legislation of many continental European
countries, which were committed to preventing the reoccurrence of their recent
odious histories and the dangerous consequences arising from surveillance of their
citizens and intrusion on individual liberties through the use of information
technologies. Indeed, in those countries, particularly Germany and France, there
was an almost universal consensus to formulate rigid policies to contend with the
threats posed by a free and unregulated use and manipulation of personal
information.17
Certainly, the horrors of recent European history and the subsequent
international conventions played an important role in the development of data
protection laws across Europe and, ultimately, at EU level in the adoption of
Directive 95/46/EC. Two other factors, however, proved decisive for its enactment
under the remit of the EU: (i) the progressive development in computers and
information technologies, together with the dangers that this could represent for
individuals, transcending national affairs; and (ii) the need for the free movement of
personal data within the Community to solve trade disputes arising from separate
national regimes, hence the harmonization of data protection laws of the Member
States.18 In the end, the real aims and scope of Directive 95/46/EC were (i) the
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948. Council of Europe, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005.
17 For example, data protection is embedded in the Constitutional charter of Spain, Portugal, The
Netherlands, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland, a
stance also taken in other European countries, from Germany to France, and to Italy. See
D. HEISENBERG, Negotiating Privacy, Lynne Rienner, London 2005, Chs 1, 2, 3;
V. MAYER-SCHONBERGER, ‘Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe’, in P.E.
Agre & M. Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, The MIT Press,
Cambridge 1997, pp. 219–241; C.J. BENNETT & C.D. RAAB, The Governance of Privacy, The
MIT Press, Cambridge 2006, Chs 1, 5; S. SIMITIS, ‘From the Market to the Polis: The EU
Directive on the Protection of Personal Data’, 80.Iowa Law Review, 3, 1995, pp. 445–469.
18 See Directive 95/46/EC, Recitals 1–11.
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protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of Europeans and (ii) the
achievement of the internal market. Both objectives were equally important, though
in mere legal terms the existence of the Directive and the jurisdiction of the EU
rested on internal market grounds, having its legal basis in then Article 100a of the
EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU).
Nevertheless, in the drafting of the law the EU institutions consistently took a
rigorous ‘fundamental human rights’ approach. This stance was particularly
important, because it meant that data protection automatically trumped other
interests and could not be traded off for economic benefits.19
Any possible discussion about this standpoint and its desirability has been
recently made explicit by Article 16 TFEU, which elevates the provision on data
protection to a ‘provision of general application’ under Title II alongside other
fundamental principles of the EU. It also imposes on the EU legislator to establish a
certain and unequivocal legal framework for data protection. Equally, with the
Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has become binding,
and in its Article 8 it recognizes the protection of personal data as an autonomous
right distinguished from ‘privacy’.
Indeed, data protection refers to the protection through regulation of
personal information pertaining to an identified or identifiable individual (data
subject). Individuals do not own information about themselves. Information does
not pre-exist to its expression or disclosure, but it is always to some extent
19 HEISENBERG, supra n. 17; MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra n. 17; SIMITIS, supra n. 17.
Indeed, the draft relied heavily on the German and French data protection laws, reflecting views
that data privacy could not be traded off against commercial interests or other rights such as
freedom of expression. Moreover, there was a strategic element to the choice of labelling data
protection as a fundamental human right. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) had ruled that it
was bound by the constitutional traditions of the Member States and it could not uphold measures
incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states.
According to the ECJ, thus, the EC could not take away the Member States’ guaranteed rights, and
there was therefore a legal duty not to harmonize at the lowest level in order to avoid conflicts
between EC law and the Member States’ Constitutions (Internationale Handlelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (C 11/70) [1970] ECR 1125, [1972]
CMLR 255; Nold (J.) KG v. Commission (C 4/73) [1974] ECR 491, [1974] 2 CMLR 338). Not all
Member States approved the described ‘fundamental human rights approach’ taken by Directive
95/46/EC. In particular, the United Kingdom sided with its business community, complaining that
the new standards were much higher than the law existing at the time, mainly maintaining a
utilitarian stance and disagreeing on the fact that data protection should not have been traded off
for economic benefits. Isolated in its position, the United Kingdom abstained from voting on the
Directive, signalling to its business community that it had opposed its strict provisions. On the
utilitarian approach of the United Kingdom, see A.T. KENYON & M. RICHARDSON, ‘New
Dimensions in Privacy: Communications Technologies, Media Practices and Law, in A.T. Kenyon &
M. Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2006, pp. 1–10.
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constructed or created by more than one agent.20 Normatively, no copyright or
proprietary rights exist on personal information. It pertains to an individual, but it
does not belong in a proprietary sense to him/her and those who process personal
data (data controllers) have the right to process data pertaining to data subjects as
long as such processing is lawful, for example, they abide to procedural rules set by
a law whose objective is to protect individual citizens not against data processing
per se but against unjustified collection, storage, use, and dissemination of the data
pertaining to them.21 As De Hert and Gutwirth persuasively show, data protection
cannot be reduced to a late privacy spin-off echoing a privacy right with regard to
personal data, but it formulates the conditions under which information processing
is legitimate. While privacy laws derive their normative force from the need to
protect the legitimate opacity of the individual through prohibitive measures, data
protection forces the transparency of the processing of personal data enabling its
full control by the data subjects where the processing is not authorized by the law
itself as necessary for societal reasons. In short, data protection law focuses on the
activities of the processors and enforces their accountability, thus regulating an
accepted exercise of power.22
To appreciate the difference between the two concepts in practice, take the
example of a customer of a telephone operator. He/she has given away his/her
personal data in order to benefit from the required service. Suppose two different
scenarios in the case the customer needs to contact the telephone operator, no
matter what the reason is: (a) the customer widely uses the service and he/she is a
big spender; (b) the customer makes a moderate use of the telephone and spends
little money on it. In scenario (a), he/she manages to access the operator of the call
centre straightaway or with a short wait time; in scenario (b), by contrast, he/she is
hold on the line for a long time before an operator answers, at times to the point
that the customer hangs up the telephone in frustration. The telephone company,
without the customer knowing, has invested in software that screens customers’
spending and accordingly prioritizes phone calls from those who usually spend
20 A. ROUVROY & Y. POULLET, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of
Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’, in S. Gutwirth et al.
(eds), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, Heidelberg 2009, pp. 45–76.
21 On discussions about individuals not owning information about themselves, see J. KANG & B.
BUNTER, ‘Privacy in Atlantis’, 18.Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 2004, pp. 230–267;
ROUVROY & POULLET, supra n. 20.
22 P. DE HERT & S. GUTWIRTH, ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxembourg:
Constitutionalisation in Action’, in S. Gutwirth et al. (eds), Reinventing Data Protection?,
Springer, Heidelberg 2009, pp. 3–44. On a critical view that data protection acts are seldom privacy
laws but rather information laws, protecting data before people, see S.G. DAVIS, ‘Re-Engineering
the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity’, in P.E.
Agre & M. Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, The MIT Press,
Cambridge 1997, pp. 143–165.
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more. This would hardly be a violation of the customer’s privacy as he/she has
provided voluntarily his/her personal data including for reasons of customer
support. However, many would say that such practice is discriminatory as the
telephone company makes an excessive use of data that it already holds.
These principles are reflected in the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, such
as those that require that data processing must be done for legitimate, explicit and
precise purposes, limited to the necessary time frame, which have to be previously
notified to the concerned individual (principles of purpose specification and data
minimization); or those granting to data subjects the right of access to their data; or,
again, those requiring that there should be a valid legal basis for the data
processing, such as consent of the data subject, another overriding right, or a legal
obligation (the latter two may be summarized under the ‘principle of necessity’ of
the processing, which still needs to be notified to data subjects).23
There is a considerable amount of literature available about the perils of an
indiscriminate use of information technologies in today’s information society. Just to
give few examples, it is well known that technologies have the potential capability of
aggregating an enormous amount of data in a short time, manipulating, storing,
retaining, and disseminating them as quickly to an indefinite number of third
parties that may access them from many different points. Then, data may be
inaccurate, outdated, out of context, expressed in an unintelligible form, and so on.
Consequently, they make it possible to follow an individual’s information trail step
by step, manipulate his/her economic decisions, profile and/or categorize people,
sort and/or discriminate them, impede forgetfulness (the possibility to forget as well
as being forgotten), enable people to change and/or progress, infringe (if not stele)
their identities, create reputations, and so forth.24 In practice, today there is an
23 In short, the said data protection principles aim at providing that personal data must be:
– processed fairly and lawfully (Directive 95/46/EC – Art. 6a);
– collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a
way incompatible with those purposes (Directive 95/46/EC – Art. 6b);
– adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and/or further processed (Directive 95/46/EC – Art. 6c);
– accurate and kept up-to-date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data
that are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were
collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified (Directive
95/46/EC – Art. 6d);
– kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is nec-
essary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed (Directive 95/46/EC – Art. 6e).
24 See, for example, C. KUNER, ‘Privacy, Security and Transparency: Challenges for Data
Protection Law in a New Europe’, 16(1).European Business Law Review 2005, pp. 1–8; J.D.
HANSON & D.A. KYSAR, ‘Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation’, 112(7).Harvard Law Review 1999, pp. 1420–1572; D.J. SOLOVE, ‘The Virtues of
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unprecedented scale of personal data left on the Internet or for commercial
purposes. Data may be easily disseminated and/or databases may be created, which
may undergo data mining techniques. Accordingly, the ways of collecting personal
data have become increasingly elaborated and less easily detectable.25 For example,
they can be used for targeting certain individuals or excluding others from certain
products or services (marketing), they can be used for making risk assessments
about dealing with certain individuals and on what terms, they may be used for
tailored pricing, and so forth. In soft cases, consumers may be annoyed for
receiving unsolicited offers or having their e-mail inbox full of undesired
commercial messages; more seriously they may feel offended for having been
profiled as persons different from their perceived real self, they may be offended
for not being treated as other customers or classified at a lower level (e.g., in the
case of scoring) or ignored, even worse they may be forced to pay more than others
for the same products or services (such as for telephone or Internet facilities or
utilities), or worryingly they may be even excluded from certain products or
services (e.g., from obtaining online facilities, credit, a mortgage, a particular
product, or even a to rent a home). It is undeniable that such forms of actual or
predictive profiling, classification, or discrimination may lead to serious social
consequences and problems also when applied in the commercial sphere.
In short, information processing and technologies have a clear potential to
influence dramatically the lives of people, and this provides an exceptional power in
the hands of those who use them, a risk only recently perceived by business and
consumer associations alike.26 Like privacy, therefore, data protection finds its
roots in the idea that democratic societies should not be turned into societies resting
on control, surveillance, actual or predictive profiling, classification, social sorting,
and discrimination. It is not only a matter of individual liberty, intimacy, and
dignity of individuals but a wider personality right aimed at developing people’s
social identity as citizens and consumers alike. Hence, it has to be agreed with the
conclusion that, although ‘data protection principles might seem less substantive
and more procedural compared to other rights (…) they are in reality closely tied to
substantial values and protect a broad scale of fundamental values’27 that on many
occasions may overlap or intersect but remain separate from those of privacy. For
that reason, it also has important connotations for society as a whole, and it
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure’, 53.Duke Law Journal 2004, pp.
967–1062; S. RODOTÀ, Tecnologie e Diritti, Il Mulino, Bologna 1995; M. LEVI & D.S. WALL,
‘Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-9/11 European Information Society’,
31(2).Journal of Law and Society 2004, pp. 194–220.
25 See, for example, European Commission, supra n. 1, and London Economics, Study on the
economic benefits of privacy enhancing technologies – Final Report to the European Commission
DG Justice, Freedom, and Security (July 2010).
26 Ibid.
27 DE HERT & GUTWIRTH, supra n. 22, p. 44.
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constitutes an important legislative tool to protect a collective social good and
fundamental values of a modern democratic order where citizens freely develop
their personality and autonomy. Therefore, both privacy and data protection
regimes (i.e., seclusion and legitimate opacity on the one side, and inclusion and
participation on the other side) represent a bundle of legal protections and tools to
pursue the common goal of a free and democratic society where citizens develop
their own personality freely and autonomously through individual reflexive
self-determination and for collective deliberative decision making regarding the
rules of social cooperation.28
From this perspective, granting to individuals’ control over their personal
information is not only a tool to allow them control over the persona they project in
society free from unreasonable or unjustified associations, manipulations,
distortions, misrepresentations, alterations or constraints on their true identity but
also a fundamental value pertaining to humans to keep and develop their
personality in a manner that allows them to fully participate in society without
having to conform thoughts, beliefs, behaviours or preferences to those of the
majority or those set from above by the industry for commercial interest.29 In this
sense, the rights conferred by data protection legislation are participatory rights of
informational self-determination, where the requirement of individual consent for
the processing of data is the cornerstone unless the processing is necessary, subject
to notice to data subjects pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC, for
the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party, for compliance
with a legal obligation of the data controller, to protect a vital interest of the data
subject himself/herself, for public interest, or for overriding rights of the data
controller or third parties.30 As such, the instrument of consent as the tool to grant
such participatory right rests on the expression of a classical liberal conception of
autonomy and individualism.
However, as the next section will attempt to demonstrate not only that the
instrument of consent may be easily misused or abused but also that placing the
focus exclusively on individual autonomy to protect a collective good may
jeopardize or hamper both effective self-determination of individuals and the
realization of the social values and benefits upheld by data protection rights. This
element may prove crucial in view of the proposed reform of the current EU legal
framework for data protection.
28 ROUVROY & POULLET, supra n. 20.
29 Ibid.
30 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 7(b) Directive.
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PART II
4. Data Processing Consent
The issue of consent is a complex one that raises difficult questions in many areas of
the law. As such, it has attracted specific attention in its own right.31
At European level, Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
explicitly recognizes consent of data subjects as the main condition to enjoy the
fundamental right to the protection of personal data:
[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data (…) and data must be
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law [emphasis
added]
Likewise, the central legal requirement under the current legal framework set by
Directive 95/46/EC is that personal data must be processed fairly and that, in the
absence of another necessary basis set by the law, the ‘unambiguous consent’ of the
data subject is the central ground for processing, which empowers the data subject
in the control over his/her data and in his/her self-determination.32 The Directive’s
definition of consent is limited to ‘any freely given specific and informed indication
of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data
relating to him being processed’.33
The EU Commission has recognized that the ‘notion of “unambiguous
consent” (Article 7a) in particular, as compared with the notion of “explicit
consent” in Article 8, needs further clarification and more uniform
interpretation’.34 In maintaining their duty to transpose the provisions of Directive
95/46/EC into domestic law, the Member States – with the exception of the United
Kingdom – all allow for the processing of personal data on the basis of consent in
terms almost identical to those used in the Directive or at least close to it with some
additional requirements.35 Moreover, in the majority of countries consent is given
31 See, e.g., D. BEYLEVELD & R. BROWNSWORD, Consent in the Law, Hart, Oxford 2007.
32 Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
33 Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC. Recital 30 of the Directive, in turn, simply defines consent as an
expression of the will of the data subject.
34 Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 4, p. 17.
35 Overall, there is substantial convergence between the continental European States on the basic
definition of consent or at least on its application in practice. For example, the data protection laws
of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden word the
definition of consent in more or less exactly the same terms as the Directive. German law requires
that consent should be given in writing, while Italian law stipulates that consent should be
documented in writing. By contrast, UK law does not define consent, and the data protection
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primary status over other criteria. This appears in line with Recital 30 of the
Directive that considers consent as the first condition to be met for a lawful data
processing. However, in countries such as the United Kingdom, consent should be
relied upon only as a last resort.36 This different interpretation is deemed to reflect
the different conception that in most continental European States data protection is
based on constitutional principles, and consent – as its essential component – has
been a part of the constitutional doctrine of these States ever since the concept of
the right to information self-determination took shape.37
Three key elements may be identified in Article 7 of the Directive, which
should form the backbone of every domestic implementation of the notion of
‘consent’: (i) it must be unambiguous, as ambiguous consent does not preclude all
doubts that the data subject has expressed his/her will, and therefore it is not
consent; (ii) it must be freely given, as enforced consent obtained under coercion,
undue influence, or pressure is no consent; (iii) it must be specific and informed so
that all processing activities are properly described, as uninformed or vague
consent is no consent.
At least, these elements seem to shed some light over the illegitimacy of
assumed or implicit consent and some practices making use of it. This seems the
view taken by the large majority of Member States that require for any consent to
be manifest. Likewise, such a consent seems to be not admissible for the purposes of
data protection inasmuch as the data subject must express his/her will
unambiguously for such an expression to be clear and conclusive.38 A non-response
by a data subject is ambiguous as long as specific information is not provided and
no option has been given to freely decide whether agreeing or not. Arguably,
therefore, consent should clearly emanate from the data subject in a way that no
doubts exist over his/her agreement, whatever form it takes, oral or written.39
authority on occasions relates the nature of the consent required to the circumstances, while
elsewhere it expressly refers back to the Directive in its guidance on the law. See Commission of the
European Communities, Analysis and impact study on the implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in
Member States (Brussels, 16 May 2003), 10; D. KORFF, ‘Comparative Summary of National Laws’,
EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive (Study Contract ETD/2001/B5
3001/A/49), p. 27; J.L. PINAR MANAS, ‘Consent of the Data Subjects’, in Conference of the Rights
and Responsibilities of Data Subjects, The Council of Europe and the Office for Personal Data
Protection of the Czech Republic (Prague, 14 and 15 Oct. 2004).
36 WEBSTER, Data Protection in the Financial Services Industry, Gower, Aldershot 2006, p. 24; P.
CAREY , Data Protection – A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2004, 72.
37 See KORFF, supra n. 35, p. 74; PINAR MANAS, supra n. 35, p. 67.
38 Commission of the European Communities, Analysis and impact study on the implementation of
Directive EC 95/46 in Member States (Brussels, 16 May 2003), p. 10; WEBSTER, supra n. 36, p.
24; CAREY, supra n. 36, p. 72.
39 This view has been shared explicitly by the Data Protection Authorities of the Member States. See
KORFF, supra n. 35, pp. 74–78; PINAR MANAS, supra n. 35, pp. 67–74. The United Kingdom
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However, despite such an apparently robust legal protection accorded to
data subjects, consent may be obtained by a number of methods and has proved
problematic as a basis for personal data processing as it could be easily abused,
confused, or conflated. This is particularly important because in theory a consent
that does not meet the requirements of the law or that is vitiated should be regarded
as void, invalidating all data processing ex tunc.
5. Abused, Confused, or Conflated Consent
There are many instances, particularly in commercial transactions, where the
empowerment of consumers and the nature of ‘data processing consent’ may not
always be properly applied or is often confused. Also, there are many situations
where there is a clear unbalance between the consumer (data subject) and the
business counterpart (data controller).
Moreover, the complexities of some business models, data collection tools and
practices, vendor/customer relationships and/or technological applications may
make it impossible for consumers to understand or freely and actively decide to
accept the consequences of consenting to the processing of data, particularly when
faced by perceived immediate economic or other benefits in kind. In practice, these
occurrences happen not only in the context of online transactions but also, more
generally, in the inclusion of notices of data processing consent in the standard
terms of contract for the purchase of goods or services, whether online, on hard
paper, or verbally.
A known online phenomenon is that of consent by opt-out, which enables the
automatic processing of data unless a data subject explicitly objects to such data
processed (i.e., he/she opts-out). In light of the proposed amendments to the EU
data protection legal framework, it is now accepted and recommended that, as far
as information and communication technologies in the consumer domain are
concerned, the optimal solution is to counterbalance the benefits of technological
advancements and risks for individual data protection by complementing the legal
framework with the principle of ‘privacy by design’: accordingly, data protection
safeguards should be incorporated in the design and operation of technologies and
systems so that they will become default settings and new legal norms will provide
for such binding requirement for technology designers and producers, as well as for
data controllers. Hence, opt-in consent will become a key explicit element that
once more provides an exception. Guidance on the law, issued by the data protection authority,
suggests that consent may, in certain circumstances, be implied. According to KORFF (p. 75), this
interpretation is doubtful in terms of compliance with the Directive, which requires that the data
subject’s agreement to any processing be ‘signified’. The author suggests that, presumably, the UK
data protection authority’s guidance must be read as meaning that a data subject’s consent can be
inferred from signals which imply his agreement, even though such signals may not be very explicit.
487
permits the processing of personal data by data controllers that would otherwise be
forbidden.
However, treating consent as a transactional moment, using standard form
or click-wrap agreements, may constitute a mechanical or pre-functionary means of
obtaining overarching consent for data processing. The inclusion of data processing
consent in the general terms and conditions of sale or services can be a common, yet
subtle or elusive, method of obtaining consumer consent notwithstanding whether a
transaction occurs online and irrespective of the opt-in/opt-out dichotomy. As the
voluntary element is central to agreeing to something, consent becomes associated
with the legal paradigm of contract. Acceptance of a contract by a consumer
automatically signifies acceptance of a term or condition in a clause of the contract
whereby the consumer contextually agrees for the processing and/or communication
to third parties of his/her personal data.
At this stage, a key distinction should be made: there are certain personal
data that are necessary for the performance of the contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to
entering into the contract. For example, in bank transactions, if a consumer wishes
to open a current account, there are some data that are essential and necessary for
the performance of the contract without the processing of which the service and
related products, including a debit card, could not be given. This is a circumstance
already considered by the Directive, which in Article 7(b) states that the processing
is fair provided that data subjects are informed of such processing. No consent
would be required as the processing would fall within the other necessary conditions
set by the law itself. In this case, such notice could well be placed in the terms and
conditions of the contract. However, there are other data processing activities that,
although motivated by asserted economic benefits, are not strictly necessary for the
performance of the contract or to take necessary steps prior to entering the
contract. In practice, data controllers may be tempted to maximize data collection
and use for purposes beyond a necessary processing likely to have excessive scope
or deep use conditions. In the above example, for instance, this would happen if a
bank decided to use the personal data for marketing purposes and introduced a
clause that acceptance of the agreement allowed the use and communication of
personal data for marketing purposes. This is a simple example portraying an
obvious situation, but with the use of today’s technologies and complex business
organizations, there may be less obvious situations where personal data are used
and database created even if the proper notice is served to data subjects.
Arguably, however, an implicit or a contextual consent to data processing by
consenting to the general terms and conditions of sale or service does not necessarily
lead to unambiguous consent as required by Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. On the
contrary, the concepts of ‘data processing consent’ and ‘agreement of contractual
terms’ may be often confused or conflated. Thus, although the main principles of
data protection, together with the introduction of additional principles such as
‘privacy by design’, may still be valid to respond to the needs of participatory
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informational self-determination vis-à-vis the challenges posed by increasingly
sophisticated business models and customer relations, this would be far from being
a desirable application and enforcement of the existing data protection principles in
practice.40
Accordingly, consent offers a procedural justification of the values and rights
that data protection aims to promote and guarantee. If such rights have to be taken
seriously, the abuse, confusion or conflation of consent should be avoided.41 An
understanding of the requisites of what constitutes a true data processing consent
may therefore be helpful to shed some light over what would be necessary to ensure
the standards governing its application and avoid the danger that it remains just a
notional concept.
6. The Requisites of a True Consent
A major interpretative challenge is that of establishing the conditions for giving a
valid consent in the context of, and according to, data protection legislation.
6.1. Informed Consent
The primary prerequisite for the validity of consent according to Article 2(h) of the
Directive is that it must be informed. Again, if one looks at contract law, the
question of how much information is needed before a party’s consent is sufficiently
informed to enter validly into a transaction is one that has troubled academic
commentators for a long time.42 Actually, information asymmetry has informed a
great deal of consumer legislation. What has to be looked at here, however, is the
information to be given to data subjects pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of Directive
95/46/EC. The issues relating to the disclosure notices in data protection terms raise
additional complex questions on their own that would require a separate analysis.
What needs to be stressed here is that data subjects must be properly and effectively
informed, before the collection of the data, of the specific circumstances of the
processing (its purpose, the identity and details of the recipients, all the logics
behind data processing, the consequences, the valuation standards and decisions
resulting from personal profiles, possible sharing of data and the actors involved,
and so on). Such a notice must be precise and intelligible to the data subject.
Consumers must understand the facts and implications of an action to be able to
make informed choices, ensuring that they are effectively able to choose freely and
voluntarily whether or not to take part into an agreement and/or in additional
processing activities of their data for purposes not strictly necessary to the subject
matter of the agreement. Moreover, data protection notices have the essential
function of promoting transparency allowing data subjects to maintain control over
40 As envisaged by the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra n. 4.
41 See BROWNSWORD, supra n. 3.
42 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra n. 31, p. 9.
489
information relating to them. For all these reasons, therefore, it may be maintained
that data processing notices should disclose also the data mining and manipulation
techniques that may be employed, as well as the data aggregation procedures that
may be in place. To what extent these may be intelligible to average data subjects
remains an open question.
6.2. The Difference between Data Processing and Contractual Terms
The consent to process personal data for the specific purposes of the contractual
relationship between the parties of a contract should be distinct from the
legitimization of business organizations processing consumers’ data for purposes
related, but not essential, to the supply of goods or provision of services that are the
subject matter of the underlying agreement. The former processing, in fact, would
be necessary in order to conclude and continue the business transaction per se,
which is a processing separate from that of additional activities, even when these are
ancillary to the principal relationship. As it would be necessary for the performance
of the contract, it falls within the scope of Article 7(b) of the Directive and does not
require consent. This leads to the important consideration that, in consumer
transactions, account may be taken of more than one type or instance of consent of
the consumer/data subject: the consent that is a requisite for the conclusion of the
legal dealing between a supplier and a consumer (the contract) and the consent of
the consumer regarding the processing of his/her personal data. This means that
consent, for the processing of those data not covered by the necessity principle of
Article 7(b), cannot be given by accepting the general terms and conditions for the
service that he/she requires.43 This is also a corollary of the rule that ‘consent’ for
data processing must be specific ex Article 6(b).
In principle, the rights conferred by the data protection legislation are
enjoyed by a data subject independent of the package that has to be negotiated with
a supplier of goods or services, precisely in the same fashion described by Howells
and Weatherill with regards to the rights conferred to consumers by consumer
legislation or those enjoyed by workers under employment law.44
Also, the function of consent in data protection is different from its function
in contract: in the former instance, it represents a permission for what would
otherwise be a violation of a data subject’s right or, as defined by Brownsword, a
43 PINAR MANAS, supra n. 35, p. 76. See also Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party on Data
Protection, Opinion 5/2004 on unsolicited communications for marketing purposes under Article 13
of Directive 2002/58/EC, 11601/EN WP 90, adopted on 27 Feb. 2004. According to Art. 7(b) of the
Directive, personal data may be processed if the processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data
subject prior to entering into a contract.
44 G. HOWELLS & S. WEATHERILL, Consumer Protection Law, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, pp.
14–18.
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procedural justification for the underlying right;45 in the contractual type of
consent, by contrast, the function of consent would not be to give to one party a
defence against the breach of the other party’s rights, but it functions instead to
create new rights and duties in the relationship between the parties.46
A thorough account of the reasons behind the importance of consent in
contract law is provided by Smith, according to whom two possible explanations
exist: (i) consent matters because it is a prerequisite for establishing responsibility,
and responsibility is a prerequisite for legal liability; (ii) preferably, consent matters
because a non-consensual contract may give rise to an unjust enrichment.47
Arguably, none of the two suggestions would apply to consent under the data
protection law, unless one considers personal data exclusively as a commodity
neglecting the rationale and justification of data protection. Indeed, advocates of
the view that there may be a contractual relationship between the data subject and
the data controller support the idea that individuals have proprietary rights on
their information, which constitute an asset in the information society and therefore
may be the object of economic transactions.48
As seen, however, the conceptualization of data protection derives its
normative force from fundamental values and freedoms and not from property.
Data processing consent, therefore, would be best viewed as a unilateral act, which
would make it more consistent also with the fact that in the law it is neither always
necessary nor always sufficient.49
Unlike in private law, thus, data processing consent would be best
understood as providing an ongoing act of agency to the data subjects rather than
45 BROWNSWORD, supra n. 3.
46 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra n. 31, p. 7. The authors specify that particularly in
consumer contracts, the law requires that consent should be free and informed, thus suggesting that
the law might set the same conditions for consent irrespective of the function played by consent.
47 S.A. SMITH, Contract Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 324–331.
48 See, for example, S. BIBAS, ‘A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy’, 17.Harvard Journal of
Law and Public Policy 1994, pp. 591–605; P. MELL, ‘Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness’, 11.Berkeley Technical Law Journal
1996, pp. 1–92; J. LITMAN, ‘Information Privacy/Information Property’, 52.Stanford Law
Review 2000, pp. 1283–1312; A.R. MILLER, The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks,
and Dossiers, Ann Arbor, Chicago 1971, p. 21; P.M. SCHWARTZ, ‘Property, Privacy, and
Personal Data’, 117.Harvard Law Review 2004, pp. 2055–2128; V. BERGELSON, ‘It’s Personal
but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information’, U.C. Davis Law Review 2003,
pp. 379–451; A.D. MOORE, ‘Toward Informational Privacy Rights’, 44.San Diego Law Review
2007, pp. 809–845; J.E. COHEN, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object’, 52.Stanford Law Review 2000, pp. 1373–1437; P. SAMUELSON, ‘Privacy as Intellectual
Property’, 52.Stanford Law Review 2000, pp. 1126–1171.
49 D. SOLOVE, ‘Conceptualising Privacy’, 90.California Law Review, pp. 1087–1154; ROUVROY &
POULLET, supra n. 20, pp. 72–74.
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an isolated moment of contractual agreement when the parties communicate their
intention to be bound by a specific agreement.50
In summary, in contract law the consent of the individual is necessary to
conclude the contract and obtain the service that he/she requests. By contrast, in
the ‘consent’ required for the legitimate processing of data that do not fall within
the scope of Article 7(b) of the Directive, the data subject’s consent does not have
the element of causal necessity for the activity and purpose of the data controller
with whom he/she intends to enter into an agreement. After all, the issue of the
processing of personal data that are not strictly necessary for a given circumstance
is not unknown to data protection: indeed, it is the one that justifies the use of
consent ex Article 7(a) of the Directive separately from the underlying transaction
or operation ex Article 7(b) of the Directive.
6.3. Freely Given Consent
Another fundamental feature is that, as a general rule, each instance of consent
should be the free choice of the individual. Arguably, in fact, in data protection
terms consent would be meaningless if people have no option but to consent in order
to obtain a benefit or a service that could be provided nonetheless.
The conditions for a free and voluntary consent lead to the very essence of its
meaning, which has to be examined within the context in which it is provided.
As seen, the expression of will, in order to be regarded as having been given
voluntarily, must refer explicitly to the processing of personal data, and not to the
consent to conclude the principal contract. This would already be a sufficient
reason to maintain that the refusal by a data subject to permit an amount of
processing of personal data that is not necessary for the provision of a service that
he/she requires should not mean that he/she is failing to consent to that service. Or,
again within the category of data that does not fall within the ‘necessity principle’, it
may well be the case that someone may agree with the processing of some data but
not certain other data. A typical example is that of commercial marketing: no one
denies that it is an important economic activity that would increase the profitability
of an industry, this latter circumstance possibly being reflected also in an economic
advantage for consumers. It is well accepted in data protection, however, that data
controllers may not obtain the giving of the consent to process the data for such a
purpose upon the understanding that the goods or services may not otherwise be
purchased or obtained. According to the Directive and read in conjunction with the
50 See also I. KERR et al., ‘Soft Surveillance, Hard Consent – The Law and Psychology of Engineered
Consent’, in I. Kerr et al. (eds), Lessons from the Identity Trail, Oxford University Press, Oxford
2009, Ch. 1.
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proportionality principle, such a practice to obtain consent would lack its freely
given element.51
However, some may reasonably contend that this application would contrast
with the basic principle of ‘freedom of contract’, which is an issue related but
different from the incorporation of data processing consent in the terms and
conditions of contract. For example, it could be suggested that if data subjects do
not accept data controllers’ processing and own procedures, albeit a separate
request for consent, thus failing to consent according to Article 7(a) of the Directive,
then data controllers would be free to refuse to enter into a contract that would
leave the data subject without the good or service required. Either a data subject
accepts to provide such a permission or a commercial organization should be free to
avoid any business with him/her. After all, parties of a contract and commercial
organizations, in particular, do not have any obligation to enter into a contract with
all applicants. Or if the data subject does not want to provide such a consent, he/she
has always the alternative of not entering the contract.52
From a different viewpoint, others may contend that almost no contract is
consensual because there is always pressure for everyone, for one reason or
another, in order to live in this world. This leaves no choices for the parties except
to enter into contracts. This is the view expressed by Hale, who believed that people
have no choice but to enter contracts for any aspect of their life so that
‘coerciveness is not a ground for condemnation except when used in the sense of
influence under pain of doing a morally unjustified act’.53
However, it seems that such views of the contractual type of consent neither
correspond to the letter nor to the rationale of the provisions of the Directive, whose
enactment finds its justification in the protection of the freedom of individuals and
the other values explained earlier.
At any rate, these two views that share the thread to reduce the concept of
consent to other concepts such as wrongdoing, efficiency, distributive justice and so
on have been thoughtfully criticized on the ground that people do not make use of
consent in either of the ways mentioned above and that the reasons for consenting
51 See, e.g., C. KUNER, European Data Protection Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, Ch.
5J; D. BAINBRIDGE, Data Protection Law, XPL, St Albans 2005; R. JAY, Data Protection Law
and Practice, Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, London 2007, Chs 12 and 22.
52 See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, ‘Economic Duress and the Overborne Will’, 98.The Law Quarterly Review
1982, pp. 197–202; this view has also been explored by SMITH, supra n. 47, pp. 331–339.
53 R.L. HALE, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State’, 38(3).Political
Science Quarterly 1923, pp. 470–494, at 476. See also F.A. HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty,
Routledge, London 1960. According to the author, for instance, ‘even if the threat of starvation (…)
impels me to accept a distasteful job at a very low wage, even if I am “at the mercy” of the only man
willing to employ me, I am not coerced by him or anybody else’ (p. 137).
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are not the same as the consequences of consenting. In this latter sense, the
difference that is emphasized is between ‘consent’ and ‘causation’.54
Moreover, these are notions of consent that have been condemned for flirting
with the myth of the equality of power in negotiations and relationships between
organizations and individuals.55
Smith provides an interesting alternative account of consent. Focusing on the
nature of the relevant pressure affecting the free and voluntary provision of consent
in the context in which it is released, and accepting the imprecision of its notion, the
scholar suggests that consent is free not only in the absence of pure states of
necessity but also in the absence of substantively unfair contracts.56
This is also the view preferred by other scholars who robustly maintain that,
for the notion of consent to work as a true source of personal responsibility, the
individual would have to be in a strong bargaining position when facing a
commercial organization.57
All these considerations have pushed consumer lawyers to the point of
doubting whether there are any general principles of traditional contract law left
where consumers are involved, stressing how in these circumstances contract law
operates in a manner quite distinct from the classical notion of freedom of
contract.58
Looking at the issue of consent from this perspective, it may be noted that the
concept of ‘unfair term’ is employed in the language of European consumer
legislation.59 It finds its justification in the imbalance between supplier and
consumer, as well as in the perceived need of the law to be shaped in accordance
with the costs and benefits of having standard form contracts.60 As such, the
assessment of unfairness is subjected to the ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance
test’ in the parties, a notion that is also increasingly used in the area of data
protection for the assessment of the provision of a valid consent by data subjects
who are perceived to be in a position of having unequal bargaining power vis-à-vis
data controllers.61 Actually, some commentators stress that the rationale for the
54 SMITH, supra n. 47, pp. 332–333.
55 S. LEADER, ‘Inflating Consent, Inflating Function, and Inserting Human Rights’, in J. Dine & A.
Fagan (eds), Human Rights and Capitalism, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006, pp. 28–47.
56 SMITH, supra n. 47, pp. 331–339.
57 LEADER, supra n. 55, pp. 28–47.
58 See HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, supra n. 44, pp. 14–35.
59 Directive 93/13/EC, OJ 1993 L 95/29 replaced by Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ 2005 L 149/22.
60 HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, supra n. 44, Ch. 1.
61 Y. POULLET & J.M. DINANT, ‘The Internet and Private Life in Europe: Risks and Aspirations’,
in A.T. Kenyon & M. Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 60–90. T. LÉONARD, ‘E-commerce et protection des données á
caractère personnel: quelques considerations sur la licéité des pratiques nouvelles de marketing sur
internet’, Internet & Recht, Maklu, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn 2001, pp. 418–451; S. GARFINKEL,
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data protection law in its current form is to enable individuals to bargain more
effectively over the use of their personal information.62
Importantly, for the assessment of unfairness the tests make reference to the
requirement of allowing a choice to the consumer, particularly in the absence of
alternative contracts that do not contain the objectionable clause and clauses that
make consent a condition of the contract. It is suggested that a standard industry
practice for uses of information that effectively deprive the data subject of a choice
is questionable where such uses are not essential for the purposes of the contract.63
Others further question the validity for data processing purposes of
consumers’ consent that is solicited in exchange for economic advantages or for fear
of not being allowed to obtain goods or services or obtaining them of a lower
quality.64 This phenomenon is also known as ‘engineered consent’ or ‘engineering of
choice’: if data subjects have to give more information than is strictly necessary to
buy goods or access services then it is likely that they will consent to whatever broad
uses of their data to obtain the goods or services they want. This objection has been
supported by the Article 29 Working Party interpreting that ‘consent given by a
data subject who (…) has been presented with a fait accompli cannot be considered
to be valid’.65
An area where such abuse of the data subject’s consent has been so far
identified is the labour market in the employer-employee relationship. This is due to
the perceived inequality and disadvantage of employees in terms of bargaining
power in the relationship and the resultant lack of proper consent in its ‘freely
Database Nation, O’Reilly, Cambridge 2001, Chs 6 and 11; G. BUTTARELLI, Banche dati e tutela
della riservatezza: la privacy nella societa’ dell’informazione, Giuffre’, Milano 1997, p. 285;
Decision of the Italian Data Protection Authority, Unione Italiana Bancari UIB/SBG v. Camera
Sindacale Provinciale Asterisco di Bolzano of 13 Feb. 1998; Decision of the Italian Data Protection
Authority, General Decision on ‘Smart (RFDI) Tags: Safeguards Applying to their use’, 09 Mar.
2005; Y. POULLET, ‘Making Data Subjects Aware of their Rights and Capable of Protecting
Themselves’, Conference on the Rights and Responsibilities of Data Subjects organised by the
Council of Europe and the Office for Personal Data Protection of the Czech Republic (Prague, 14
and 15 Oct. 2004).
62 P.E. AGRE, ‘Introduction’, in P.E. Agre & M. Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New
Landscape, MIT Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 1–28, at 12.
63 See, e.g., JAY, supra n. 51, pp. 152–153; G. HOWELLS, ‘Data Protection, Confidentiality, Unfair
Contract Terms, Consumer Protection and Credit Reference Agencies’, 4.Journal of Business Law
1995, pp. 343–359.
64 POULLET & DINANT, supra n. 61; LÉONARD, supra n. 61; DAVIS, supra n. 22, pp. 143–165;
YOUNES-FELLOUS, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, Workshop on
Privacy and Data Protection Issues (Brussels 13 Feb. 2007). According to D. GIBSON, Aspects of
Privacy Law, Butterworths, Toronto 1980, ‘consent’ clauses in application forms ‘can hardly be
regarded as voluntarily given, since the subject’s free-will is likely to have been overborne by the
desire to succeed in the application’ (p. 122).
65 Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection, Working Document on a Common Interpretation of
Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114 of 25 Nov. 2005 for Adoption, 11.
495
given’ element.66 True, the example of the labour relation may not be entirely
satisfactory for commercial transactions if one looks beyond an already established
employer-employee relationship. In fact, it could be argued that the situation would
be different when individuals are in the open job market. Here, it could be said,
they will have a free choice whether or not to apply for a particular job. If consent
to a certain processing of personal data is a condition of an application being
considered, this would not prevent the consent being freely given. As the British
Information Officer has stated, however, ‘as recruitment proceeds the opportunities
to obtain valid consent are likely to be reduced. If for example, the consequences of
not consenting is the automatic withdrawal of a job offer the consent is unlikely to
be given freely’.67
In the end, therefore, consent might be formally free in the sense that there is
not a single or traditional method of forcing individuals into a transaction by
commercial organizations, but if the costs of not consenting are considerable in
relation to the situation at stake and there are no live options, then consent can be
said not to be materially free.68
6.4. Specificity and the Other Requirements of the Law
Some may think that ‘consent’ may be sufficient to legitimize data processing on
those occasions where no other legitimizing circumstances of the Directive are met.
However, in the terms of the Directive and most of the national implementing
legislation, consent does not exist in isolation. On its own, it does not appear to be a
sufficient basis for legitimate data processing but must be considered in conjunction
with other requirements, particularly those relating to specificity, purpose
limitation, and proportionality.69 For example, it would be a violation of the data
protection principles to ask consumers to sign authorizations, unlimited in subject
matter, essentially purporting to give permission to data controllers to process any
personal data that they unilaterally decide to be relevant, and disclose that
information for expanding purposes to any person willing to pay for it. By contrast,
this study has already emphasized that one of the primary concerns of the Directive
is to ensure that data subject’s consent specifically to all uses for which the data is
processed. A processing based on consent cannot be regarded as lawful if sought for
general or vague aims or if the data subject has no possibility of knowing the
66 Ibid. R. FRAGALE FILHO & M. JEFFERY, ‘Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy:
Notice and Consent’, 23.Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 2002, pp. 551–567. See also
CAREY, supra n. 39, pp. 72–73.
67 British Information Commissioner, available at <www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_
protection/practical_application/coi_html/english/supplementary_guidance/conditions_for_processin
g_sensitive_data.html>.
68 LEADER, supra n. 55; L. BECKER, Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations, Routledge,
London 1977, pp. 76–77; AGRE, supra n. 62.
69 See, e.g., POULLET & DINANT, supra n. 61; KORFF, supra n. 35.
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recipients of his/her data. This would be regarded as a way to evade the limitations
imposed by the law.70
Moreover, since consent must be specific, it could be problematic to obtain
the data subject’s consent if the occurrence and specific circumstances of a
processing are not known at the time consent is requested, so that the impact on the
data subject cannot be assessed.71
In the implementation of the Directive, several countries have made it clear
that even if a controller obtains the consent of the data subject, there are still the
other requirements of the law to be respected, and a processing that does not meet
those requirements is unlawful irrespective of the consent. This is because the right
to data protection is often viewed not only as a personal right but also as a public
concern and an issue of social protection embedded in the Constitutions of a
number of Member States.72
6.5. Revocability of Consent
As a unilateral act, it is inherent in its nature that it can be withdrawn by the data
subject at any time, albeit without retrospective effect.73 Thus more, consent may
be withdrawn if the data processing is not necessary for the service provided or it
may be denied for a further processing that may be compatible, but still different,
from the original purpose of the processing. This is also the reason why consent is
seen as an unlikely and ephemeral mechanism to provide an adequate long-term
framework for data controllers in cases of repeated communications and further
processing.74 Again, some may be tempted to think that a solution could lie in
contract: consent, in fact, would not be withdrawn by a data subject, at least for a
certain lapse of time, if it had been given under contractual arrangements that limit
its withdrawal. However, for all the reasons explained above, in legal terms such an
obligation should not be incorporated in the standard terms of a commercial
agreement with consumers, leaving no option to consumers to exercise the right of
withdrawal.
In the end, therefore, there remains little alternative but to agree with the
Article 29 Working Party when it interprets consent in data protection in a
restrictive manner, to the point of suggesting that ‘relying on consent may therefore
70 Consent must be specific. Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 7(a).
71 See, for example, Art. 29 Working Party, supra n. 43.
72 See KORFF, supra n. 35, pp. 74–78; R. WONG, ‘Privacy: Charting Its Developments and
Prospects’, in M. Klang & A. Murray (eds), Human Rights in the Digital Age, Cavendish, London
2005, pp. 147–161.
73 KORFF, supra n. 35, reports the UK Information Commissioner suggesting that ‘even when consent
has been given it will not necessarily endure forever. While in most cases consent will endure for as
long as the processing to which it relates continues, data controllers should recognise that the
individual may be able to withdraw their consent’ (p 78).
74 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra n. 43.
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prove to be a “false good solution”, simple at first glance but in reality complex and
cumbersome’.75
PART III
7. Limiting Abuse, Confusion, or Conflation of Consent
Policy documents reveal that ensuring informed and free consent remains a priority
for a comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the EU.76 Likewise,
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU mandates the consent of
data subjects as a core condition to enjoy the legal right to the protection of
personal data in the EU.
However, it has been shown earlier how growing abuse, confusion or
conflation of consent have made it unreliable to guarantee a high level of protection
for data subjects, which makes it difficult its reconciliation with the policy
objectives set at EU level.
The current normative approach to consent reflects the argument that the
right to data protection rests on the individual’s choice about the processing of
his/her data and that no one is better placed to judge and decide about the use
of data than the concerned data subject himself/herself. Such liberal conception of
autonomy and approach based on individualism may be acceptable if supported by
the liberal stance that personal information may be an alienable commodity in a
proprietary sense to be protected or traded at the discretion of the individual to
whom the information pertains. In any case, it would assume the absence of
information asymmetry and power inequality between data controllers and data
subjects. Equally, it would underestimate that secondary transfers and data mining
make it almost impossible for ordinary people to verify in what measure the
conditions for data processing have been respected. Besides, it would not consider
the issue of positive discrimination: signalling by others may render the free choice
of consent a façade to avoid the stigma attached to silence or not consenting for the
processing of information. If a group of individuals finds it in his self-interest to
disclose information for perceived benefits, others may need to disclose their
personal data to avoid the stigma attached to silence or for not being present in a
database (i.e., positive discrimination).77 Finally, such approach would overlook
75 Ibid.
76 European Commission, supra n. 1.
77 On signalling and disclosure of personal information, see S.R. PEPPET, ‘Unraveling Privacy: The
Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure Future’, forthcoming in Northwestern
University Law Review (2011), available on SSRN at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1678634>.
498
that disclosed personal data may be relevant not only to the data subject but also to
others with whom he/she entertains or has entertained relationships of any nature.78
This work has attempted to show that data protection is tied to substantial
values for a democratic society. Thus, there may be a paradox or a conflict between
the described current normative approach and all that has been said earlier in this
work about the importance of data protection and the required high level of
safeguards. For that reason, stand-alone normative solutions based on enhanced
individual control and empowerment of data subjects seem unsatisfactory vis-à-vis
the challenges posed by the complexities of business models, customer relationships,
and technologies. Moreover, they would reinforce the assumption that the formal
voluntary acceptance of data processing and disclosure causes no harm or problem
precisely because it reflects the active choice of the concerned individual, meeting
the formal requirement of the law.
Certainly individual control over information is important as long as the real
meaning of consent is fully accepted and applied in practice. In this sense, it has to
be agreed with the stance that the potential of the position of data subjects in
Directive 95/46/EC has not been fully used and the new European legal framework
should specify the requirement of consent to give ex ante a stronger voice to data
subjects.79
Accepting that data protection is not only an individual right but also a social
good with profound social implications, some scholarship has indeed recognized that
protecting personal data rests not only on respect for individual autonomy but also
on social welfare concerns, social freedom, and participatory democracy. Even this
scholarship, however, concedes that data protection is not exclusively a social good,
and individuals should retain the ability to exercise control over their
information.80
It seems unquestionable that data protection is a tool to protect a free society
where individuals freely develop their personality, that is, a social good.
Nevertheless, there may be a degree of contradiction in continuing to assume and
not departing from the proposition that individuals should remain able to alienate
their personal data so long as they are fully informed and do it voluntarily. Or at
least, the scholarship’s response does not fully address solutions beyond individual
control.
It is not suggested that the data protection regime should liberate from the
constraints of consent and self-determination or abandon the stance that data
protection should involve a degree of personal control over information. On the
contrary, transparency and explicit true consent remain key to inform a properly
78 ROUVROY & POULLET, supra n. 20.
79 Articlee 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra n. 4.
80 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra n. 48; D.J. SOLOVE, Understanding Privacy, Harvard University
Press, Boston 2008.
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functioning policy for the enhancement of individual autonomy and the full
development of people’s personality in a free society. However, to be effective, a
better application of consent or specification of its requirements should be assisted
with measures that go beyond the idea of individual control and autonomy.
A solution may rest on the correction of the limits of autonomy-enhancing
measures with additional legal constraints that might prevent or reduce abuse,
confusion, or conflation. Such legal constraints would not be any different from
those that inform consumer law and policy. As in the consumer law domain, they
could be explained on a number of different bases. This work has mentioned before
of the power and information inequality between data controllers and data subjects,
which would justify further regulation to correct a market failure. Equally, another
ground for justifying such constraints could be found in the enhancement of
distributive justice and ends, that is, in the redistribution of resources or rights on
the basis of what is fair rather than what is merely economically efficient to protect
data subjects as the weaker party of the data controller-data subject relationship.
Probably, however, paternalism would better explain additional legal
measures that would find their justification in the social judgment that data
protection is a tool to protect a social good and even if transacting free agents allow
for the processing of their data over certain permitted levels, which should be
prohibited because of social harm is greater than the benefits of allocative efficiency
typical of freedom of contract.
Libertarians may argue that such interfering with individual autonomy and
free choice is not a marginal cost. Anglo-Saxon scholarship and liberal ideology, in
particular, could be wary to accept overriding decisions by law-makers over
individual autonomy and liberty.
An approach based on soft paternalism, however, would not necessarily
deprive individuals from freedom of choice but only shove them towards wise
decisions in the interest of society as a whole that are not simply taken to gain
pressing illusory personal benefits of the moment. Soft paternalism or ‘libertarian
paternalism’ indeed suggests that, while people remain free to choose, at the same
time they are provided with cognitive escorts leading them towards the desired
outcome for the welfare of society as a whole (and, ultimately, for their own
welfare).81
This approach would involve legislation adopting, as a default rule, an
outcome that is desirable to protect the social good in the interest of society but
where individuals might opt-out for an alternative, less desirable outcome. Thus,
alongside the existing rules that restrict the use that data controllers may do with
personal data irrespective of the way they have obtained them, there should be
81 On soft legal paternalism see, e.g., A. OGUS, ‘The Paradoxes of Legal paternalIsm and How to
Resolve Them’, 30.Legal Studies 2010, pp. 61–73; C. SUSTAIN & R. THALER, ‘Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’, 70.The University of Chicago Law Review 2003, pp. 1159–1202.
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complementing measures normatively addressing inquiry (from data controllers)
and disclosure (from data subjects) boundaries to reinforce informed explicit
consent.82
Inquiry limits are rules that restrict the ability of an uninformed party to ask
for disclosure from the party who has the information. At the same time, they
should be accompanied by normative directions as to the bar over attaching
negative consequences for silence or failure to consent to data processing. For
example, this already exists in the case of legislation forbidding potential employers
from asking a potential employee his/her age. In the data protection realm, thus,
alongside informed explicit consent it would be a matter of normatively introducing
as a default rule that data controllers may not seek data processing permissions in
one instance specifying that more instances of consent depending on strict
processing purposes should be sought without affecting the capability of data
subjects to obtain the goods or services they apply for.
A possible example may be that of the Canadian Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000, which contains an explicit ‘refusal
to deal provision’, prohibiting organizations from requiring consent to unnecessary
processing as a condition of the transaction, demanding additional consent for it.83
Equally, to remove psychological barriers to provide consent, the law should
contain comprehensive normative disclosure limits, making it explicit that data
subjects may always be allowed to refuse consent or withdraw it at a later stage
without negative consequences or strings attached.
Finally, normative qualification would be needed that data processing
consent is a unilateral act that cannot be part of the agreement of the general terms
and conditions of contract for those data that are not strictly necessary for the
provision of a service or supply of goods: data subjects’ consent would be invalid
when incorporated in a commercial contract if the data subject cannot express
consent separately from his/her consent to contract. Take the example of fidelity
cards used by supermarkets: it would be perfectly legitimate to offer such cards to
customers to make them loyal, offering prizes or discounts once a certain
accumulation of points has been reached. The data processing would be required
for the purpose of running the scheme and the benefit for the data controller would
be the loyalty of customers. However, there should be no contextual processing for
profiling customers or further disseminating their data. Even better, customers
should be asked in a separate instance of consent whether they wish this to happen
knowing that no consequences would be attached for their refusal and that
nevertheless they would enjoy the same level of discounts or prizes.
82 Also referred as ‘don’t ask’ and ‘don’t tell’ rules. See PEPPET, supra n. 77.
83 PIPEDA Sch. I, Principle 4.3.1 (n. 37). See P. LAWSON & M. O’DONOGHUE, ‘Approaches to
Consent in Canadian Data Protection Law’, in I. Kerr et al. (eds), Lessons from the Identity Trail,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 23–42.
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In the end, a form of legislative intervention grounded in soft paternalism
may be consistent with traditional notions of individual autonomy where there
would be no requirement with which individuals would be forced to comply with.
Rather, it would be a question of the extent to which such device is effective in
pushing, not forcing, individuals towards the desirable outcome for society as a
whole.
Some may reasonably say that Directive 95/46/EC already requires data
minimization and purpose specification. However, given the current practices and
data mining techniques, the letter of the law should leave no doubt and it should not
be left open to different interpretations. At any rate, the real innovation or
strengthening of the rules of consent envisaged by EU policy makers would insist in
the choice to data subjects of opting out to added default rules aimed at impeding
those very technological and commercial practices that have driven the need for
modernization of the existing EU regime.
8. Theoretical Model for Additional Legal Constraints
Although legal paternalism is well rooted in the European heritage and there may be
a greater readiness to recognize that the State should take responsibility to promote
social welfare and protect his weaker members,84 there may be difficulties for policy
makers with a solution that would almost certainly override economic interests. As
for privacy, the perception of the harm caused by the weaknesses of the data
protection regime, generally, and the current form of consent, in particular, remain
abstract, and the threats posed by data processing abuses may be easily often
perceived as intangible. As a consequence, such intangible harm and risks may not
be concrete enough to induce legislators to take action vis-à-vis the prospect of data
controllers better marketing products to consumers or more accurately assessing
credit risks or vis-à-vis the powerful lobbies of the data controllers.85
Crucially, however, the Treaty of Lisbon has tightened data protection and
mandates a stricter regime where data protection may not be seen any longer as a
purely ‘functional construct to be used to directly shape and influence the use of
information-processing technology’.86 The European legislation has taken a holistic
perspective where the declared key objective is the strengthening of individuals’
rights vis-à-vis the more powerful data controllers. It derives its normative power
from primary sources such as a ‘provision of general application’ of the Treaty of
Lisbon (Article 16 TFEU) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Probably,
from a legal positivist point of view, giving application to primary legal sources
would be already a sufficient ground to override conflicting economic interests and
84 OGUS, supra n. 81, pp. 65–67.
85 This is also a consideration made by PEPPET, supra n. 77, in the context of a signalling economy
and the digital dossier.
86 MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra n. 17, p. 235.
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rebalance the participatory self-determination of data subjects in the information
market.
Therefore, it may be maintained that in the new framework the increased
profits of the industry may not of itself warrant the same lax practices of obtaining
data subjects’ consent and stricter rules on consent may be tolerated. On the
contrary, perhaps, the EU legislator may be persuaded to sacrifice such aspect of
the right to data protection in the interest of the economic benefit of society
generally. Such utilitarian arguments, however, would need to be very strong in
order to outweigh the effective protection of a fundamental right enshrined in the
highest ranks of EU law. So, any possible utilitarian argument would be justifiable
only if one takes an ‘interest’ perspective out of the notion of data protection. This
perspective would see the protection of personal data as one among many interests
in society, including the commercial exploitation of personal information.
Responding to the above utilitarian view, these ‘interests’ would need to be
balanced in the light of overall social utility.87 As the situation stands, however, data
protection is a legal right. The ‘right’ perspective embedded in European legal
culture, however, should give its preferred position at least against those interests
that are not characterized as legal ‘rights’. After all, as rightfully pointed out by
others, ‘in Europe, there is a politico-legal commitment to respect for human rights;
that is (…) Europe has chosen rights rather than utility as the governing ethic’.88
Thus, data protection as a legal ‘right’ with derivation from European law should
trump interests such as the commercial exploitation of personal data.
Common law lawyers would probably be more comfortable with the
theoretical position encapsulated in Ronald Dworkin’s notion of ‘rights as trumps’
to accord a higher justificatory status to data protection rights than the economic
advantages resulting from the commercial exploitation of personal data by data
controllers. Within this theoretical model, rights are to be protected and promoted
to the greatest extent possible before other interests could be taken into
consideration. However, common law lawyers may encounter some difficulties in the
defence of this position to the extent that Dworkin concedes that rights may
legitimately be limited where the cost to society would be of a degree far beyond the
price paid to grant the original right,89 which in some commentators’ view ‘amounts
to saying that rights are not conclusive, but only create strong presumptions that
87 See also HOWELLS, supra n. 63, pp. 353–354.
88 BROWNSWORD, supra n. 3, p. 85.
89 See R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London 1977. In the author’s famous
formulation, rights ‘trump’ utilitarian values.
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the individual interests or choices at stake should be protected against collective
encroachment’.90
Whatever the right-based theoretical model and approach are, this would
justify and require commercial data controllers to find alternative methods for their
aim or to accept making fewer profits – which would not mean making a loss but just
accepting lower returns. Arguably, markets may be competitive without excessive
profits being made. In fact, to what extent excess profits are optimal from the point
of view of consumer welfare is a complex economic matter and remains open for
discussion.91
By contrast, the increased awareness and recognition of the importance of
data protection should not lead to what has been defined as a ‘schizophrenia’
where, on the one hand, it is reflected in the legal protection at the highest levels of
EU law and policy but where, on the other hand, it is eroded by market interests
that head towards the diminution, abuse, confusion, or conflation of the aspired
safeguards or guarantees.92
9. Conclusions
This work investigated data processing consent as the linchpin of EU data
protection legislation in light of the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and the
announced reforms of its legal regime.
At EU level, the recognition of data protection as a legal right dates back to
Directive 95/46/EC. To meet the challenges of rapid technological developments and
of the modern economy, the EU is undergoing consultations to reform the current
legal framework and propose a new comprehensive regime. The TFEU and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU have given new emphasis and significance
to the protection of personal data, which is now a sui generis right clearly
distinguished from privacy. Data protection has now been upgraded as a treaty
provision of general application and formally recognized as a fundamental right of
the EU. Indeed, data protection and privacy may be re-conceptualized as a bundle
of legal rights and tools to pursue the common goal of a democratic society not only
free from unjustified intrusion and surveillance but where citizens may develop
their personality freely and autonomously through individual reflexive and active
participation in society. Therefore, data protection principles, as a legal tool,
should be seen as less procedural and more substantive to protect and guarantee the
underlying fundamental values.
90 A. MCHARG, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and
Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 62.The
Modern Law Review 1999, pp. 671–696, at 683.
91 See I. RAMSAY, Consumer Law and Policy, Hart Oxford 2007, pp. 76–78.
92 S. RODOTA’, ‘Data Protection as a Fundamental Right’, in S. Gutwirth et al. (eds), Reinventing
Data Protection?, Springer, Heidelberg 2009, pp. 77–82.
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Data processing consent is a crucial component of data protection law to give
effect to the goal it purports to achieve. Reflecting a classical liberal conception of
autonomy and individualism, in which individuals ought to know what is best for
themselves and are able to take decisions accordingly, it provides individuals with
some control over their personal information and the persona they project in
society. However, the way in which it is currently devised in the law and its
application provide an insufficient protection for individuals and an inadequate
safeguard for the values it aims to protect vis-à-vis the realities of marketplace
practices and economic interests.
There is certainly some truth in the opinion of the EU data protection
authorities that the full potential of the position of data subjects in the law has not
been fully exploited and the current data protection principles remain valid. This
work has analysed the meaning of a real consent to inform a better application of its
notion against possible confusion, conflation, or abuse. At the same time, however,
taking into account the inherent weaknesses of consent as a safeguard of a social
good, additional legal measures would be necessary for a better application and
specification of the requirements of consent. Additional norms to be introduced in a
new data protection regime should adopt, as a default rule, an outcome that is
desirable for society as a whole but where individuals might opt-out for a different
outcome without gains at the expense of the goals that the law aims to achieve – or
specifying that refusal to consent or silence should not bear negative consequences
for the underlying transaction. The suggestion is that there should be inquiry and
disclosure limits complemented by the normative qualification of consent as a
unilateral act, with all the following legal consequences that this entails. This work
has addressed a possible solution in soft or libertarian paternalism to compromise
between traditional views of individual autonomy and the need to raise the
safeguards for an effective self-determination for the extent made possible by the
law. After all, a liberal democracy that embraces values of citizen participation and
autonomy should take rights seriously and lead not only to a greater but also to an
effective control by citizens over their information.
Admittedly, policy makers may find difficulties in resisting or overriding
strong economic interests in the absence of tangible harm or threats. However, a
rights-led approach as it is now imposed by the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, supported by a legal positivist theoretical model,
means that data protection cannot remain an empty box and should override
economic interests. The notion of consent should not be fictionalized, which occurs
when the formal quality of consent is conflated or confused to cover and abuse
unequal power relations beyond the state.93 Each legal regime has certain
fundamental value commitments, in these cases the protection of dignity, liberty,
93 LEADER, supra n. 55.
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participation, and data protection. Thus, as rightly reminded by Beyleveld and
Brownsword, ‘to the extent that a legal regime claims legitimacy for its operations, it
claims, first, that its operations are consonant with such basic constitutional values
and, secondly, that these values themselves are worthy of respect (as legitimate)’.94
To the extent that legal regimes owe a duty to maintain public confidence in
their operations and respect for the constitutional values and regulatory positions
that they take, such as data protection, consent should be taken seriously and its
procedural justification should not abused; otherwise, it would become unclear
whether the legal regime operates legitimately.95
94 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, surpa n. 31, p. 358.
95 Ibid.
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